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INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE - JURISDICTION -
RESOLUTIONS TO EXPAND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AND TO IMPROVE THE COURT'S IMAGE AS A VIABLE
ALTERNATIVE TO ACHIEVE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES
In the past the policy of the United States toward the International Court
of Justice has been characterized by verbal support' and actual neglect. ' This
attitude has been identical to that found within the world as a whole.3 Through
the years, however, there have been attempts by various individuals and groups
to change the United States policy.' These efforts have produced five Senate
resolutions5 which are broad in scope and varying in direction.' Collectively,
they were specially designed to increase the use of and confidence in' the Court
I Administrations throughout the years since the development of an international court have
supported the idea of world peace through law. President Kennedy at The American University
graduation in 1963 delivered a speech in which he declared "peace is a process, a way of solving
problems."
Only seven claims have been brought by the United States since the 1946 establishment of the
I.C.J. Hearings on S. Res. 74, 75, 76, 77, 78 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93d Cong.,
Ist Sess., at 159 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
The report of the Lodge Commission in 1971 stated:
[Slince 1946 the United States has committed itself, without reservations, to the jurisdic-
tion of the Court in over 20 multilateral treaties and 20 bilateral agreements with respect
to disputes arising from those agreements. This is a commendable way for widening the
Court's jurisdiction, but these agreements are only a small portion of the more than 200
bilateral and multilateral treaties subscribed to by the United States since 1946.
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE OBSERVANCE OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH ANNI-
VERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, at 12 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lodge Commission].
See Hearings at 160 for a list of treaties and agreements of the U.S. which contain a provision
for submitting disputes to the Court.
3 At the time the hearings for these resolutions were being conducted, the Court's docket
contained only three cases; two were contentious, and the third was a request for an advisory
opinion. See Hearings, supra note 2, at 17. These cases have since been disposed of by the Court.
They were the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3 (deciding
the merits of the dispute over Iceland's unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights); the Fisher-
ies Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 175 (deciding the
merits of the dispute over Iceland's unilateral extension of exclusive fishing rights); and the Advi-
sory Opinion on Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal [1973] I.C.J. 166 (grievance of a U.N. employee).
E.g., the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1960, debated a resolution which, if it
had passed the Senate, would have led to the repeal of the Connally Amendment. Hearings on S.
Res. 94 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
' These resolutions were introduced on 1 March 1973, were reported to the Senate floor as
amended on 9 May 1974, and passed by voice vote on 20 May 1974.
The House has also introduced a resolution of its own with respect to access to the I.C.J. H.R.
556 was introduced 20 September 1973 and assigned to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which
has not reported the measure at the present time.
7 In introducing the resolutions, Sen. Cranston stated that the resolutions were designed to
"[e]xpand the jurisdiction of the Court by gradual degrees; [and] [i]ncrease the number of cases
submitted to it .. " 119 CONG. REC. 3760 (daily ed. March 1, 1973).
1 One of the primary aims of the sponsors is to have issues submitted to the Court which are
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in order to assist the development of a better defined body of international law.
The resolutions were aimed specifically at United States behavior in foreign
affairs; they attempted to set a course in which this country will become an
example for the remainder of the world to emulate in achieving settlement of
international disputes through law rather than violence., S. Res. 74, 75, 76, 77,
78, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 8430 (daily ed. May 20, 1974).
Several characteristics of the international system, buttressed by the belief
that there should be an international forum for discussions of international
problems'" open to a wider field of participants than presently admitted,
prompted the sponsors to introduce the resolutions. The Connally Amend-
ment" has always prohibited the United States from making an unqualified
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. Other nations have like-
wise filed declarations 3 of compulsory jurisdiction containing reservations
with the U.N. Secretary-General." This course of action, tending to limit the
number of claims that are filed or adjudicated 5 and the number of requests for
advisory opinions made to the Court, leads to the charges that the I.C.J. is an
almost useless instrument for welding international peace.'" There is a prevail-
not a threat to national security or the sovereign's image. By encouraging the use of the court
machinery, it is hoped that a body of international law can be clarified yielding a structure on which
parties can base their expectancies.
Note, also, that Sec. Rogers in his 1970 address to the American Society of International Law
stated "[in our zest to take giant steps we have failed to take the confidence-building smaller steps
which are necessary to move from routine and less significant international cases to more important
and major ones." Address by Secretary Rogers, 1970 annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law, April 25, 1970, in 62 DEP'T STATE BULL. 623 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Address].
I A co-sponsor of the resolutions, Senator Taft, cited further purposes when he spoke on the
floor after passage arguing that "[p]assage of these five resolutions will help to promote interest
in the court and reaffirm the Senate's interest in long-range peaceful alternatives to international
confrontation and violence." 120 CONG. REc. 8432 (daily ed. May 20, 1974) [hereinafter cited as
Resolutions].
1* Problems most often cited during the hearings were terrorism, hijacking, and pollution. See
generally Hearings, supra note 2.
II 61 Stat. 1218, para. 2, clause b (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1598.
,2 The six word reservation, "as determined by the United States," often has been a troublesome
matter in U.S. foreign affairs since the Senate resolution containing the phrase was passed in 1946.
See 92 CONG. REC. 10694 (1946) for a record of the debate on the Senate floor prior to the vote.
,3 According to the facts found by the Lodge Commission (Senator Taft was a member) forty-
eight states have accepted compulsory jurisdiction either with or without reservation under the
"optional clause." The rest of the U.N. membership has not bound themselves in any way. Lodge
Commission, supra note 2, at 12.
" I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 4.
II Declarations of compulsory jurisdiction with reservations have contributed to or caused the
dismissal of several cases. Among the best known are the Interhandel Case, [1959] I.C.J. 6 (U.S.
invoked the Connally Amendment against Switzerland although the Court did not base its dis-
missal on that theory); Case Concerning the Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, [1960] I.C.J. 146
(Bulgaria, through reciprocity, invoked the amendment against the U.S.); and Case of Certain
Norwegian Loans, (France v. Norway), [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9 (Norway invoked France's self-
judging reservation against that country).
1' This situation has led at least one Secretary of State to describe the Court as "moribund."
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ing fear among governments of submitting a legal issue to the Court if the issue
is of any importance to the security or the image of that country. This fear rests
on the fact that the government does not or can not know what standards or
criteria will be used in adjudication." Even if the issue is argued before the
panel of justices, the vagueness of the Statute 8 and the Charter 9 as to enforce-
ment will make the decision virtually meaningless and relief unattainable if
there is no voluntary compliance.
Positive action in the area of expanding the Court's jurisdiction has not been
a characteristic of many U.S. administrations. 0 However, in former Secretary
of State Rogers' address to the American Society of International Law in
1970,2" the Secretary summed up the Department's commitment to strengthen-
ing the international judicial system and made suggestions for the future.2 The
State Department in the past has found that a major obstacle in the United
States' initiatives to encourage the use of the Court has been the Connally
Amendment,23 since the U.S. cannot encourage compulsory jurisdiction with-
out appearing hypocritical. These fears, the inaction on the part of the United
States in expanding jurisdiction, and the desire for world peace through law
culminated in the adopted resolutions.
Each resolution2 4 attempts to attain the goals outlined by means of the small
1970 Address, supra note 8, at 263. However, by the time the Senate hearings for these resolutions
were held, the State Department had revised its estimate of the Court's usefulness based on the
fact that the judicial body had improved its process of adjudication evidenced by the timely
disposition of the issues in the Namibia Mandate Question. Letter from Marshall Wright to
Senator Fulbright, May 10, 1973, in Hearings, supra note 2, at 261 [hereinafter cited as Letter to
Fulbright].
1 This feeling was expressed by Senator McClure in the debate before the vote on these resolu-
tions. Resolutions, supra note 9, at 8429.
IS The Statute states that judgment is final and without appeal. I.C.J. STAT. art. 60. But the
Statute does not make provision for enforcement.
1g The role of the U.N. as to instances of noncompliance likewise remains unclear in the Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 14; id. art. 24.
21 See notes I & 2, supra.
21 See 1970 Address, supra note 8.
2 For example, Sec. Rogers suggested that additional international organizations, as well as
disputing states, be authorized to request advisory opinions. He also suggested that greater use be
made of the Court chambers and that these abbreviated panels meet outside The Hague to make
the Court more visible to the world.
An additional comment was made as to the Department's policy to submit to the Court's
jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of multilateral treaties to
which the U.S. is a signatory. The Secretary stated that the Department would continue to follow
this policy and would attempt to expand it wherever appropriate. See 1970 Address, supra note 8.
23 "One of the major stumbling blocks we have encountered in pressing this initiative is the
attitude of many States that if the United States is really interested in strengthening the Court, it
must first repeal the Connally Amendment and urge other States to repeal their similar reserva-
tions, since their continued existence would serve to undercut severely any other attempts to
strengthen the Court." Letter to Fulbright, supra note 16, at 261.
24 The Senate Resolutions are included in Appendix to this Recent Development.
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steps suggested by Secretary Rogers. 5 Section One of Res. 786 suggests the
most radical change of all the five resolutions as it departs from the traditional
notion that only states have standing in the international judicial system. 21 The
usefulness of the study proposed by Section One, that is, to analyze the various
ways to grant access to the Court, is enhanced by the request that a study be
made of the feasibility of establishing a special committee of the General
Assembly which would have authority to request advisory opinions from the
I.C.J. on behalf of the persons mentioned in the first section of the Resolution.21
The wording of this last Resolution was amended29 before the committee ap-
proved it, due to the testimony of several witnesses that the proposal as origi-
nally written was unrealistic °
Res. 7731 was also amended3 before it was recommended to the full Senate.
As passed, the resolution both reaffirms and restates in part the acceptance by
the United States of Chapter VI of the Charter.
Several housekeeping matters are dealt with in Res. 763 in an attempt to
encourage the greater use of the Court. The first section was amended 3 to
utilize the chambers of the Court 35 in order to make the Court more accessible
for the solution of regional disputes where negotiation fails. The revision was
made because of the improbability of the Statute being amended.3 ' The second
section, also revised, 37 suggests that the President take all "appropriate mea-
sures" to allow regional organizations and any two or more disputing states to
request advisory opinions of the I.C.J.3 s Sections Three and Four respectively
See note 8, supra.
See Appendix, infra.
l.C.J. STAT. art. 34, para. I.
2' The parties which would be beneficiaries under § I are individuals, corporations, nongovern-
mental organizations, intergovernmental organizations, regional organizations, and other natural
or legal persons. Their proposed access to the I.C.J. or other international tribunals is limited to
questions of international law stemming from activities directly pursued by those parties.
2 The original version of Res. 78 provided for amendment to the Statute in order that the Court
might grant jurisdiction to the class of persons listed in the final version. See note 28, supra.
30 Among others, former Justice Jessup expressed doubts that a change was realistic given the
political atmosphere of the Security Council. See generally Hearings, supra note 2.
3' See Appendix, infra.
2 Res. 77 as first proposed called for states to submit to the Secretary-General a declaration
of its recognition of compulsory jurisdiction, without reservation of that jurisdiction, when the
Security Council, by an affirmative vote of nine members, including eighty per cent of the perma-
nent members, requested the parties to submit the dispute to the Court. See Hearings, supra note
2, at 10.
3 See Appendix, infra.
Formally the Resolution called for the establishment of regional courts with original jurisdic-
tion, whose decisions would be appealable to the I.C.J.
3 I.C.J. STAT. art. 26; id. art. 29. I.C.J.R.P. 31 (3).
36 See note 30, supra.
'3 The former wording suggested that the President propose amendments to Art. 96 of the
Charter so as to allow regional organizations and disputing states to request advisory opinions.
" There is no guide in the section as to what "appropriate measures" would or could entail.
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advise that the President undertake appropriate steps to improve the methods
by which judges are nominated and elected,39 and that the President encourage
the I.C.J. to sit and exercise its functions outside The Hague when feasible.4 0
The other two resolutions are of lesser note. Res. 75"1 calls for the United
States to include in all future treaties, and other international agreements
adopted subsequently to this resolution, a clause providing that any dispute
arising from the interpretation or application of the agreement, if not settled
by negotiation, be submitted to the I.C.J. or other appropriate body for a
binding decision. Res. 742 added to the original version 3 the provision that
the United States was to submit as many as possible of the outstanding terri-
torial disputes that can not be solved through diplomatic channels.
As a series, the resolutions strive toward high goals, but they do so only in
an unspecified manner. The wording of several of the amended passages are
much weaker than the original phrasing." Part of the dilution is attributable
to the impracticality of some of the proposals. 5 As diluted however they only
serve to hint at substantive action and do not constructively forge ahead in the
stated aims of the resolutions. The revision of Section One of Res. 7646 makes
the resolution more practical in that establishing another layer of courts would
The section was changed for the same reasons as were those in the other previously mentioned
resolutions.
" I.C.J. STAT. ch. 1. Chapter I of the Statute describes how the justices are presently selected.
" I.C.J. STAT. art. 22.
" See Appendix, infra. This resolution was the only one of the five not substantially amended.
It enjoyed the support of the State Department and most of the witnesses at the hearings although
suggestions were made as to possible improvements.
" See Appendix, infra.
41 The original version had suggested that the Secretary of State be requested to submit twenty-
eight particular U.S. territorial disputes to the I.C.J. for binding decisions. Letter to Fulbright,
supra note 16, at 266 et seq.
" E.g., the final version of § I of Res. 76 states that "... the President should instruct the
Secretary of State to give favorable consideration to making use of the various chambers ....
whereas the original wording says that ". . . the President should undertake all appropriate steps
to have amendments. . .adopted .. " [emphasis added].
Compare Res. 77 as found in Hearings, supra note 2, at 10, with Res. 77 as printed in Appendix,
infra.
,1 It should be noted that the original versions of the resolutions which call for the amendment
of the Charter or the Statute were supported by witnesses at the hearings only for their ultimate
purposes of expanding jurisdiction and increasing the work load and not for the suggestion of how
to fulfill those purposes. For example, § 2 of Res. 76 in the original version suggested that the
President propose amendments to Article 96 of the Charter which would expand the range of bodies
that would have standing to request advisory opinions of the I.C.J. The final version of the Section
only called for the President to attempt to expand the range of entities which could request the
advisory opinions. The reason for the change was primarily due to the negotiation problems which
would have developed in the U.N. if the amendments had been proposed. This political obstacle
was pointed out in testimony by witnesses at the hearings. The problem has been mentioned
previously in notes 29, 30 and 36 and the accompanying text.
,1 See note 34, supra. The revision calls for the President to instruct the Secretary of State to
give favorable consideration to making use of the various chambers of the I.C.J.
[VOL. 5: 257
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
only make the process needlessly expensive and time consuming, a current
characteristic of the Court which does not encourage the submission of legal
problems. The use of the chambers should provide a more widespread interest
in the Court if the chambers exercise judicial functions outside The Hague."
Making use of the chambers is a more realistic suggestion since the institution
of an appellate process would only serve to provide one more "final" opportun-
ity to argue the position advocated. Such an extension would not serve to
realize swift justice. Of course, an additional layer of courts would have one
advantage in that a government might be more willing to take a case to the
courts if there were two opportunities to win instead of one. However, the
encouragement of just decisions within a reasonable time frame would be a
better inducement to submit legal problems to the Court than an appellate
system, particularly if submission to the Court remains largely a decision made
within a political environment.
The clientele of the Court and its use by those entities which presently have
standing could be expanded by effective administration of Res. 74, 75, and 78; 4s
but still unanswered is the question of whether or not the parties involved other
than nation-states would appear before the Court." Res. 74 requests that the
President have territorial disputes submitted to the Court in the event that such
disputes cannot be settled through negotiation. Given that qualification, a case
would probably be filed by the United States only in the situation in which the
United States found itself having the stronger argument. Otherwise, it might
prove to be more advantageous to negotiate rather than to wage a legal battle
of doubtful success. Res. 75 involves the same qualification and thus it is a
questionable guarantee of submission of legal questions to the Court. It is also
noticeable that Res. 75 does not suggest that treaties and agreements, made
previously to this resolution and which do not already include an operative
clause requiring the qualified submission, be amended to include such a clause.
The additional class of parties," to be given standing by Res. 78 would submit
cases that primarily involve questions of private, not public international law.
This could serve to increase the activity of the Court but would not insure the
construction of an accepted body of public international law.5 Section Two of
Res. 78 could encourage discussion of problems and aid in negotiations be-
tween the disputants."2
Res. 77 appears to be the weakest of the five since it, in the final version,
'7 I.C.J. STAT. art. 28.
" See Appendix, infra.
" See generally 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 344 (1971).
10 See 2 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 59, at 62 et seq. (supp. 2, 1970) for one assessment of this
topic [hereinafter cited as GA. J.].
11 Advantages of the build-up of a body of public international law would be that the Court could
gain experience in deciding issues between parties from different legal backgrounds and that a
sovereign's confidence in the Court might grow if it saw the panel acting in consensus and in an
impartial manner.
5 See GA. J., supra note 50, at 62.
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ignores the question of what specifically to do about the Connally Reserva-
tion.5 3 But the group of resolutions itself is not very specific in stating means
of achieving the desired effects stated in the individual preambles. Instead, the
five were proposed in the hope that discussion would be stimulated about the
Connally Amendment and support could be drawn for the amendment's re-
peal.5 4 If discussion and definite action by the United States does result, the
resolutions will be a welcome step in the direction of solving the problem of
providing a balance between protecting domestic jurisdiction and approaching
international security through law.
Terry K. Smith
53 Compare Appendix, infra with Hearings, supra note 2, at 10.
11 See generally Hearings, supra note 2.
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APPENDIX*
The text of the individual resolutions are as follows:
Res. 74 - Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the
submission of United States territorial disputes to the International Court of
Justice.
Whereas the adjudication of disputes which affect neither the na-
tional security nor the vital interests of the parties concerned is one of
the most practical and immediate ways to develop and strengthen an
international judicial system;
Whereas the International Court of Justice must be used by parties
to the statute of the Court if it is to fulfill its purpose;
Whereas the submission of cases to the International Court of Jus-
tice for the binding settlement of disputes between states is not a
provocative gesture but rather a step toward international peace
through law; and
Whereas the United States has contributed greatly to development
of international law and seeks an ordered world under law: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President is
requested to direct the Secretary of State forthwith to seek to submit
to the International Court of Justice for binding decisions as many as
possible of those outstanding territorial disputes involving the United
States, where such disputes cannot be resolved by negotiation.
SEC. 2. It is further the sense of the Senate that the President
should direct the Secretary of State to consider submitting to the
International Court of Justice as many as possible of the approxi-
mately 28 territorial disputes involving our country and a number of
close allies over desolate and largely uninhabited islands in the Carri-
bean Sea [sic] and the Pacific Ocean.
SEC. 3. It is further the sense of the Senate that the President
should direct the Secretary of State to make a full written report to
the Senate and to its Committee on Foreign Relations within one year
after the adoption of this resolution, and a report for each of the five
years thereafter, of actions taken and progress achieved in submitting
such disputes to the Court.
SEC. 4. The Secretary of the Senate is instructed to transmit a
copy of this resolution to the President of the United States with the
request that the President report to the Senate in due course what
actions he has taken pursuant to this expression of advice.
Res. 75 - Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to the
adjudication of disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of
international agreements.
Whereas the United States is committed to the universal rule of law;
and
Whereas the effective rule of law requires that provision be made
*Reprinted from 120 CoNG. REC. 8429, 8430-32 (daily ed. May 20, 1974).
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for an agreed third party to settle disputes as to the interpretation of
treaties and other international agreements; and
Whereas the absence of such provisions has often resulted in pro-
longed and acrimonious disputes as to the meaning of these treaties
or other international agreements or the existence of a violation of the
obligations incurred under them: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States
endeavor to include, in all future treaties and other international agree-
ments to which the United States shall be a party or which shall be
negotiated subsequent to the adoption of this resolution, operative
clauses providing that any dispute arising from the interpretation or
application of these treaties and international agreements which is not
settled by agreement between or among the States concerned shall be
subject to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or other
appropriate body.
SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate is instructed to transmit a
copy of this resolution to the President of the United States with the
request that the President report to the Senate in due course what
action he has taken pursuant to this expression of advice.
Res. 76 - Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to estab-
lishing regional courts within the International Court of Justice, increasing the
categories of parties which may request advisory opinions from the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, selecting judges of the International Court of Justice,
and having the International Court of Justice consider cases outside The
Hague.
Whereas it is desirable for the International Court of Justice to be
increasingly accessible and responsive to the need of the world com-
munity;
Whereas the International Court of Justice has been inadequately
utilized in the settlement of international disputes;
Whereas states and regional agencies are now precluded from seek-
ing advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice and the
availability of such advisory opinions would facilitate the peaceful
settlement of international disputes;
Whereas the effective role of law requires the election of impartial
judges of high moral character and recognized competence in interna-
tional law;
Whereas the Charter of the United Nations recognizes the import-
ance of the contribution of Members of [sic] the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security and to the other purposes of the organiza-
tion; and
Whereas paragraph 1 of article 22 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice provides that the establishment of the Court at The
Hague shall not prevent the Court from sitting elsewhere: Now, there-
fore, be it
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Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should
instruct the Secretary of State to give favorable consideration to mak-
ing use of the various chambers of the International Court of Justice,
including chambers convened to resolve regional disputes, where such
disputes cannot be resolved by negotiation.
SEC. 2. It is further the sense of the Senate that the President
should take all appropriate measures to attempt to expand the range
of international bodies eligible to request advisory opinions of the
Court, giving special attention to attempting to extend eligibility to
regional organizations as well as any two or more states jointly seeking
an advisory opinion on any legal questions relating to a dispute be-
tween them.
SEC. 3. It is further the sense of the Senate that the President
should undertake appropriate steps to improve, within the existing
provisions of the statute, the process whereby persons are nominated
and elected to serve as judges of the International Court of Justice.
SEC. 4. It is further the sense of the Senate that the President
should undertake all appropriate steps to encourage the International
Court of Justice, from time to time, to sit and exercise its functions
outside The Hague at places more convenient to the various parties to
the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
SEC. 5. The Secretary of the Senate is instructed to transmit a
copy of this resolution to the President of the United States with the
request that the President report to the Senate in due course what
action he has taken pursuant to this expression of advise.
Res. 77 - Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to refer-
ring international disputes to the International Court of Justice.
Whereas peace between nations will be placed on a sounder founda-
tion when they agree to follow scrupulously the terms and spirit of
chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations referring to the pacific
settlement of international disputes;
Whereas paragraph 1 of article 33 of chapter VI of the Charter of
the United Nations provides that "the parties to any dispute, the con-
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotia-
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
of their own choice";
Whereas paragraph 3 of article 36 of chapter VI of the Charter of
the United Nations provides that "legal disputes should as a general
rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in
accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court"; and
Whereas the United States is a party to the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and is dedicated to the principles by which it
was founded and is guided: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should
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direct the Secretary of State to encourage the maximum possible use
of the procedures outlined in chapter VI of the Charter of the United
Nations, relating to the pacific settlement of international disputes,
whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security, particularly those procedures provides [sic]
for the reference of legal disputes to the International Court of Justice.
SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate is instructed to transmit a
copy of this resolution to the President of the United States with the
request that the President report to the Senate in due course what
action he has taken pursuant to this expression of advice.
Res. 78 - Resolution expressing the sense of the Senate with respect to access
to the International Court of Justice.
Whereas in an increasingly interdependent world a growing number
of international entities other than nation-states influence the course
of world events;
Whereas the peaceful adjudication of international disputes to which
they are a party should be available to such international entities,
including individuals, corporations, nongovernmental organizations,
intergovernmental organizations, regional organizations, and other
natural or legal persons;
Whereas article 11 of the Statute of the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal establishes a procedure whereby upon written application
by an individual in respect of whom a judgment has been rendered by
the tribunal, a special committee may request an advisory opinion
from the International Court of Justice concerning that judgment;
Whereas article XII of the Statute of the Administrative Tribunal
of the International Labor Organization provides for certain appellate
procedures whereby a judgment affecting an individual rendered by the
tribunal can be annulled or reversed by the International Court of
Justice; and
Whereas there are still other precedents for according entities other
than states and public international organizations access to interna-
tional tribunals: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should
direct the Secretary of State to undertake a study examining and
appraising the various ways of granting direct and indirect access to
the International Court of Justice and other international tribunals to
individuals, corporations, non-governmental organizations, intergov-
ernmental organizations, regional organizations, and other natural or
legal persons, in cases concerning questions of international law arising
within the scope of activities directly pursued by such natural and legal
persons.
SEC. 2. It is further the sense of the Senate that such a study
should include an examination of the feasibility of establishing a spe-
cial committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, similar
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to the committee used for review of decisions of the Administrative
Tribunal of the United Nations, with authority to request from the
International Court of Justice advisory opinions on behalf of those
natural and legal persons referred to in the first section, concerning
questions of international law arising within the scope of activities
directly pursued by such persons.
SEC. 3. It is further the sense of the Senate that such a study
should be submitted to the Senate and to its Committee on Foreign
Relations within one year after this resolution is agreed to.
SEC. 4. The Secretary of the Senate is instructed to transmit a
copy of this resolution to the President of the United States with the
request that the President report to the Senate in due course what
action he has taken pursuant to this expression of advice.
